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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of the success of the Patriot missile system in the
1991 Gulf War on Senate roll call votes for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Previous studies have shown that both Party Identification (PID) and Ideology have
had a significant effect on senators' votes on defense weapons systems. Using Logit
regression techniques, this paper examines whether PID and Ideology, both of
which are central to political identity, remained significant factors in three Senate
votes on SDI; this paper is unique compare to previous studies of such matters in
that it adds two additional explanatory variables to existing models: (1) the extent
to which each state might benefit from SDI and (2) whether or not the senator from
each state was up for re-election in 1992 It is hypothesized that the findings will
suggest that external factors played a role in the SDI Senate votes in question.
Specifically, it is hypothesized that the effects of the Gulf War Patriot missile
successes led to greater legislative support (compared to support levels from
previous years) for the Strategic Defense Initiative among Democrats, those
senators whose states would benefit from SDI funding, and those senators seeking
re-election.
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Background
Conventional wisdom argues that a congressman's vote on defense issues can be
predicted based on both his political ideology (which is presumed to directly shape personal
opinion) and the potential benefit to his state. Most research, however, has tended to confirm the
influence of only the former while disproving the significance of the latter (McCormick, 1985;
McCormick & Black, 1983; Ray, 1981; Russett, 1970; Wayman, 1985). Findings have been
similar in studies focused on predictions of how congressional members would vote on specific
weapons systems. Again, the effects of ideology were found to have significant influence on
such votes, whereas the potential benefits to a congressman’s state were found to have no
significant influence on his vote on such matters (Bernstein & Anthony, 1974; Fleisher, 1985).
The consistency of the finding of no significance between state benefit and voting
outcomes with respect to weapons systems is surprising. Members of Congress are often
suggested to behave parochially; that is, they are believed to have a strong incentive to garner
benefits for their constituents out of a sense of self-interest (Fiorina, 1974; Mayhew 1974). While
this does not appear to be the case with respect to support for weapons systems in particular,
some studies have suggested that there are parochial effects on defense programs such as military
bases (Arnold, 1979; Twight, 1989, 1990) and some operations and maintenance programs
(Carter 1989; Higgs, 1988).
Much of the research on weapons systems has focused on anti-Ballistic missile systems
(ABM) in general and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) specifically. James Lindsay (1990
and 1991) has tested the factors that influence voting on issues relating to SDI in both the House
and the Senate and has consistently found strong support for ideology as a predictor of Senate
votes and no significant support for the effects of parochialism. While Lindsay appears to have
put the final nail in the coffin against the parochialism hypothesis on weapons systems voting,
his studies may not be conclusive on such matters for two reasons: First, both of his studies
reflect congressional voting during the Cold War. Additionally, his studies have not considered
the possible effects of international events swaying votes in one direction or another.
This study is, therefore, intended to follow up on the work of Lindsay and others on the
study of weapons systems voting by examining roll call voting on SDI in the Senate in 1991. The
choice of this particular year is intentional. The Gulf War was fought and won in January and
February of 1991, and the American public and Congress witnessed the great success of
American soldiers not only on the battlefield but also in the skies above it. Specifically, a
modified surface-to-air missile (SAM) known as the Patriot helped to shield U.S. troops and
Israeli civilians from incoming Scud missiles. The perceived success of the Patriot in its service
as an ABM device led to a new ground-swell of support in favor of developing a real ABM
system for the defense of the United States. This support centered around the Bush
administrations' Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program. GPALS was a
scaled-down version of President Reagan's original SDI vision.
As a result of this new bipartisan support for such a program, Congress passed the
Missile Defense Act in 1991. This act called upon the Defense Department to develop the
necessary missiles, radars, and sensors on satellites for an ABM system that would be compliant
with the 1972 ABM Treaty. The National Missile Defense Act further ordered that the system be
ready "by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology or by fiscal year
1996."1 Congress also endorsed a "robust" program for follow-up technologies, including
Brilliant Pebbles, a non-nuclear system of interceptors that was designed to operate without
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external guidance. Finally, the act also called for talks with the Soviet Union on amending the
ABM Treaty.
Despite bipartisan support, the Bush administration seemed unsure of how it should react
to the passing of the MDA. First it delayed the initial deployment date by a year. Then it told
Congress it did not want the first ground-based interceptor site at Grand Forks, and proceeded to
squander half a year renegotiating.2 This was a costly mistake by the administration. By the time
authorization and appropriations got underway, support for the MDA had decayed considerably.
A number of senators who had supported the MDA in 1991 turned their backs on it in 1992. The
opportunity the Gulf War had provided was lost as a result of the Bush administration's poor
handling of the momentum the war had granted them on the ABM system front.
The question remains, then, why did such hearty support in 1991 wane by 1992? This
paper proposes that in 1991, senators were responding to the support of the public for missile
defenses, spurred by the Gulf War. This hypothesis is based on the results of a poll conducted by
the Worthern group in January of 1991, which found that when the American public was asked
to agree or disagree with the following statement: "Spending billions of dollars for sophisticated
weapons in the 1980s was worth the cost because with those weapons we [saved] the lives of
thousands of American troops in the war against Iraq," 85% agreed, and only 14% disagreed. In
this paper, the hypothesis that the external Gulf War events influenced senators' voting on SDI is
tested by examining three Senate votes on SDI. In addition, added to the three variables
previously used by Lindsay (ideology, parochialism, and PID), this paper will consider the
additional variable of the prospect of re-election for each senator. This re-election variable is
used in an attempt to capture the effects of the Gulf War by suggesting that senators up for reelection were more likely to support SDI funding because it was politically popular to do so after
the Gulf War.
Data and Methods
Three Senate votes (Votes 171, 172, and 173) on SDI serve as the dependent variables in
this study. Senate vote 171 was a motion to kill a proposed amendment to cut $1.4 billion from
the $4.6 billion authorized for SDI and to prohibit any funding for the space-based interceptors
program. Senate vote 172 was a motion to kill an amendment to prohibit the deployment of the
ground-based ABM system at Grand Forks, ND. Senate vote 173 was an amendment to cut $1
billion in funding authorized for SDI. The pro-SDI position won in all three instances.
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Table One: Description of the Dependent and Independent Variables
____________________________________________________________
Variable
Description
____________________________________________________________

Senate Vote 171

Vote to kill the Harkin
amendment which would cut $1.4
billion of the $4.6 billion
authorized for SDI and
prohibits funding for the
space-based interceptors
program. Motion passed: 6038. A "yea" vote was a vote
supporting the president's
position. 08-01-91.

Senate Vote 172

Vote to kill Harkin amendment
to prohibit the deployment of
the ground-based antiballistic missile system at
Grand Forks, ND. Motion
agreed to: 64-34. A "yea"
vote was a vote supporting the
president's position. 08-01-91.

Senate Vote 173

Bumpers Amendment to cut $1
billion of the $4.6 billion
authorized for the Strategic
Defense Initiative and
transfer savings to reducing
the deficit. Rejected: 46-52.
A "nay" vote was a vote supporting the
President’s position. 08-01-91.

PID

1 = Republican;
0 = Democrat.

Ideology

Scaled NSI score (0-100)

Benefit

State Financial Benefit from SDI.
1 = Monetary Benefit;
0 = No Monetary Benefit.

Election

Whether Senator was up for Re-Election in 1992.
1 = Up for Re-Election
0 = Not Up for Re-Election.
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Four variables are used in an attempt to gauge why senators supported these measures in
1991. The first of these is a dichotomous variable measuring party identification. Democrats are
coded "0," and Republicans are coded "1." It is theorized that those senators of the president's
party (Republican) will be more likely to support the pro-SDI position than will Democrats. SDI
and defense-related issues in general are considered by most Americans to fall under the auspices
of the Republican Party. Second, a variable measuring each senator's individual ideology is used.
The senators’ ideologies are quantified using the 1990 National Security Index (NSI) scores for
senators. The NSI prepared by the American Security Council (ASC), rates members on their
support of defense and foreign policy issues. Scores range from 0 (dovish) to 100 (hawkish). It
is believed that as the scale number rises, so too does an individual’s support for SDI. Third, a
variable measuring partisan benefit is included. This serves to re-test the parochialism
hypothesis. The state benefit variable is scored as "1" for those states expected to receive some
form of financial benefit (or “pork”) from SDI and "0" for those not expected to receive SDI
such "pork." It is expected that senators whose states will receive financial benefit from SDI
funding will be more likely to support SDI. Finally, a variable measuring whether a senator is up
for re-election is added. It is a simple dichotomous variable scored "0" for those senators not up
for re-election and "1" for those who are up for re-election. It is expected that senators due to
face the voters in 1992 were more likely to support SDI. These four independent variables were
then regressed against the three individual roll call votes on SDI. Logistic regression was used
because the dependent variables were dichotomous.
Findings
Table two presents the findings of all three votes. The first vote (Vote 171) shows both
the re-election and the ideology variables to be significant. The PID and state benefit
(parochialism) variables are found to be insignificant. This is as expected.
Table Two: Logit Regression of 1991 Senate SDI Votes
_________________________________________________________
Vote Number:
171
172
173
____________________________________________________________
Constant

-2.6245
(.6831)

-1.7765
(.5670)

-2.6156
(.6537)

PID

.9081
(.9322)

-.2363
(.9610)

0.8638
(.7551)

Ideology

.0514***
(.0116)

.0518***
(.0125)

.0435***
(.0101)

Benefit

-.1842
(.7315)

-.8179
(.6851)

-.3031
(.6588)

Election

1.1414*

1.1531*

.6858
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(.0716)

(.0684)

(.6347)

Pseudo-R2

.3986

.5060

.4687

-2 log likelihood

61.642

67.996

74.044

Goodness of Fit

64.960

100.376

86.445

N:
98
98
98
___________________________________________________________
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses
*p < .10, one-tailed test
**p < .05, one-tailed test
***p < .01, one-tailed test
Vote 171 calls for a motion to kill proposed cuts in SDI spending and prohibits funding
for space-based interceptors. If there is a Gulf War effect, then senators' responses to Vote 171
should be to support SDI. While ideology remains the strongest predictor of Senate voting on
weapons issues, the significance of the election variable suggests that there was indeed such an
effect: senators up for re-election were doing what they considered to be politically popular by
voting in support of full funding for SDI, which was popular among their constituents at that
time, following the success of the Gulf War. In the second vote (Vote 172), logistic regression
likewise indicates that along with ideology, the re-election variable is shown to have exercised
an influence on senators’ votes. The logic following the previous vote applies here as well:
senators were simply moving with the majority in order to gain favor with their constituents
preceding re-election. The results of the final logistic regression on Vote 173 are slightly
different from the first two. Notably, the re-election variable drops out of significance. Ideology,
however, maintains its significant status. The likely reason the election variable drops from
significance with this vote is because it is worded to promote cutting SDI funding as a means to
reduce the federal deficit. Few things are more popular with the public than cutting the deficit,
and ABM defenses are certainly not among them.
These findings suggest that while ideology is still the strongest predictor of Senate voting
on weapons issues, there are potential effects related to the Gulf War and the seeking of
constituent support in the face of re-election that directly influenced senators’ votes. In short, the
prospect of facing the voters spurred a large number of senators to adopt a pro-SDI stance. It can
be assumed that this was a result of the success of the Patriot missiles in the 1991 Gulf War.
Additionally, these findings bolster support for the idea that international events can have a
strong effect on legislators' votes. These external effects have long been neglected in the
literature. This study has shown, however, that such effects are most likely present, manifesting
themselves in Senate voting.
A second notable result of this study has been to show that there was general bipartisan
support for the SDI program, and as such, PID alone was not a sufficient predictor in
determining how a senator would vote in any of the three cases examined. This is surprising,
considering the fact that SDI is generally considered to be a Republican-favored program and
because other studies have shown PID to have had a significant effect on legislative voting on
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weapons systems (Lindsay, 1990). The relative unreliability of PID to predict voting outcomes in
the case of these three votes seems to indicate that the external events in 1991 (i.e. the Gulf War)
curbed Democratic distaste for the program. Indeed, the lack of such partisan voting suggests
that mutual support for the program arose out of the successes of the Patriot missile system.
Finally, the results of the analysis of the three votes conducted in this study reveal no
significant state benefit (parochial) motivation behind voting outcomes. The continued
insignificance of parochialism provides even more proof that parochialism itself is simply not a
significant factor when senators make decisions on weapons systems. (Still, why parochialism or
the pursuit of state benefits by individual senators did not increase following the Gulf War
remains unclear. It would seem that the growth in bipartisan support the Patriot missile fostered
for SDI would have lead senators to have taken the opportunity to vote on behalf of their
constituents, but such voting apparently did not occur at a significant level.)
Impact
Did this burst of support for a limited ballistic missile defense system in fact produce
such a system? It did not. The George H.W. Bush administration, likely distracted by the
recession and then 1992 election, did not capitalize on the bipartisan congressional support for
such a system. Bush’s defeat by Bill Clinton effectively ended the development efforts for a
ballistic missile defense shield for the next eight years. George W. Bush, however, seemingly
intent on finishing much of the old business his father had started, renewed US efforts to produce
a defense shield. The second Bush administration withdrew the United States from the 1972
ABM Treaty in June 2002, and in December 2002, President George W. Bush signed National
Security Presidential Directive 23, which outlined a plan to deploy a national missile defense
system beginning in 2004. Most of the effort to deploy a functional system, however, was
focused on placing systems in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania. President Obama
subsequently scrapped plans to place ballistic missile defense systems in Eastern Europe in favor
of locating the interceptors on US Navy vessels.
The march toward a viable national missile defense system for the United States has been
slow. While some degree of ballistic missile threat has existed for the US homeland since 1950,
the will to construct a defensive system to protect the country has been weak. This tepidness
largely results from the high cost of deploying an effective system and the underlying attitude
that the US homeland is not threatened. This latter attitude likely will change as nuclear
proliferation continues and as the range of ballistic missiles in the hands of rogue states grows to
threaten US territory. Aversions to cost might be overcome if members of Congress believe such
an investment would produce an effective system.
What this means for contemporary politics is that the ongoing threat of nuclear
proliferation might translate into congressional support for a ballistic missile defense program if
the potential effectiveness of such a system is demonstrated during a conflict situation. The
looming conflict with Iran could provide such a scenario. If Israel attempts to destroy or degrade
Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons, Iran may respond with ballistic missile attacks against
Israel. Israel has a variety of anti-ballistic missile systems in place (Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s
Sling), built with US assistance, and, if effective, these systems could renew calls in the US
Congress for a deployment of similar systems here.
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Conclusions
Did the Gulf War affect senators' voting on the SDI? This study argues that it did,
employing logistic regression to test whether four variables influenced senators' votes on three
SDI-related votes. The findings suggest that while ideology is still the strongest predictor of
legislative voting on weapons systems, the presence of an upcoming Senate election was also a
significant factor in determining Senate votes on two occasions. Senators appear to have been
responding to their constituents' desire for continued support of ABM programs. This, coupled
with the finding that PID was an insignificant factor in determining Senate voting, suggests that
the Gulf War success of the Patriot missile created real bipartisan support for the SDI program.
As was mentioned earlier, however, this support was short in duration. The minds of the
American public quickly turned from ABM defenses to fixing the economy. The Gulf War was
forgotten, and bipartisan support for the SDI program was lost.
Thus, it is accurate to argue that President Bush lost a real opportunity to push through a
deployment scheme for an actual BMD system. The Bush administration, by dragging its feet,
allowed congressional support for the program to wane as the memories of the success of the
Patriot missile fleeted into the past. This study has shown that (1) the Senate would have
supported a deployment effort of an SDI in 1991 because of external influences, and (2) the
overwhelming support of President Bush and the U.S. military following the Gulf War led
senators to adopt a more bipartisan perspective regarding SDI.
Further study of the effects of external influences on Senate voting is needed. The effects
suggested by this study may actually be indirect with respect to their effects on Senate voting
because Senators were probably responding not only to the external influence of the Gulf War
but also to the support of their constituents for the SDI program. As such, some combination of
X and Y were likely at play (resulting bipartisan voting) a relationship that would merit further
study. What remains without question is that the Gulf War led to increased public support for
ballistic missile defense, as illustrated by bipartisan senator support for SDI programs in three
Senate votes in 1991.
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